Abstract. This paper has three objectives: First, to review the literature dealing with the assessment and evaluation of political risk by managers in international firms. Second, to build upon this literature by extending and more precisely defining the concept in a manner that facilitates integration into the planning or decision-making process. Last, the paper attempts to suggest fruitful directions for future research.
ment that has unfavorable consequences for the firm. Scholars who have explored the issue in more depth [24, 44, 46, 50] clearly distinguish between the political event1 and the actual loss or gain to the firm. They note that the consequences of any given political event for the foreign investor depend upon its nature, the conditions under which it occurs, and the characteristics of the specific investment in question. However, the existing state of the art limits operationalization in the context of the investment (or reinvestment) decision process. First, the phenomenon is not defined in a manner that allows for unambiguous classification of environmental events: that is, which are of concern and which are not. Second, while all of these authors deal with uncertainty in terms of both environmental processes (continuous versus discontinuous change) and decision makers' perceptions (uncertainty versus risk), the two processes are not explicitly linked in a manner that facilitates integration into investment decision making. Third, the concentration on discontinuous change or uncertainty limits unnecessarily the scope of political analysis. Last, the emphasis on the negative consequences of government intervention entails an implicit normative assumption that may not be universally valid.
Root is correct when he claims that the analytical distinctions of the social scientist The Political break down at the experiential level; society exists in the entirety. This most certainly Environment applies to economics and politics. Gilpin [17] , among others [8, 40] , has argued that the relationship between the two is not at all distinct, but rather interactive and reciprocal. Lindblom [40] goes so far as to suggest that differences may be entirely perceptual. It appears reasonable to ask whether there is any cause to consider the political environment separately-to distinguish between sources of business risk. There appear to be very pragmatic reasons for doing so. Economics and politics are sufficiently distinct, both as abstract phenomena and in terms of their impact upon the firm, to require separate analysis and managerial response. For example, it should be obvious that a Japanese producer's response to the U.S. imposition of steel trigger prices in 1977 would be quite different if analysis indicated that the primary motivation for trigger prices was the need to prevent the alienation of important domestic interest groups rather than strict balance of payments concerns. Defining politics in terms of power or authority relationships exercised in the context of society at large [15, 39] can usefully distinguish it from economics. This paper is concerned with events, whether they appear to be political or economic (that is, directly concerned with the production and distribution of wealth), that are motivated by attempts to gain, maintain, or increase power at the state level, "to influence significantly the kind of authoritative policy adopted for society" [15, p. 127].
Although we can distinguish between economic and political determinants of events, they are obviously interrelated. First, at least in the short run, "politics largely determines the framework of economic activity" [17] . A change in regime can result in a change from a market to a socialist economy (Cuba in 1959) or the reverse (Chile in 1973). Second, and following from the first, political or power concerns often influence economic policy. The converse is, of course, equally true. The production and distribution of wealth directly affect the distribution of power; however, the distinction has heuristic value and can be applied in practice. We would not, for example, consider a strike, or even a general strike, a political event if its motivation results from dissatisfaction over work-related issues. However, widescale strikes in Nicaragua in January 1978 protesting the Somoza regime were clearly political. Similarly, a general strike in Tunis at about the same time began as an economic event-a protest against wage restraints-and ended as a full challenge to the Bourguiba government. [31] , is useful. Given certainty, the firm does not face business risk; both outcomes of events and their impact upon the firm are known; however, political events can still affect returns. As an example, assume it is absolutely certain that a new government will come to power in one month and that it will force a firm to divest 100 percent of equity in five years at present book value. Although the political event will reduce the value of future returns, it will not in any way contribute to their variation. There is no business risk associated with the change in government.
However, once uncertainty is introduced, political events can both affect the expected value of returns and contribute to their variation. Political events are now a source of business risk. Whereas their impact upon the value of returns is not dependent upon whether the uncertainty is objective or subjective, the nature and extent of their contribution to risk clearly is. If uncertainty is objective, the contribution of political events to business risk is a function of only the events themselves. Risk, then, is the distribution of probable returns which is, ceteris paribus, a function of the probable impacts of political events on operations. If uncertainty is subjective, the contribution of business risk is a function of both the events themselves and the fact that decision makers' perceptions of those events are inherently subjective-distorted by past experience, cognitive processes and the nature of the organization. This subjectivity factor is particularly important in international business operations where decisions are often taken in one sociopolitical environment based upon stimuli arising in another. As will be discussed later, the survey data indicate that managerial evaluations of political risk are typically subjective and ethnocentric. A better understanding of the political process in general, the political environment in the country in question, and the potential impact of politics upon the firm's operations can thus obviously reduce risk by reducing the uncertainty about the actual probability distribution. However, the crucial point, one which forces us to take issue with the existing literature (for example, Haendel and West [24] ), is that while better information can help eliminate misconceptions about both the political environment and its impact upon the firm, it can seldom convert uncertainty into risk or what we have called objective uncertainty. Opinions formed about future events (and particularly events which will take place in another culture) are inherently subjective. Hannah Arendt [3] put it well: The world appears in the mode of it-seems-to-me, depending on particular perspectives determined by location in the world as well as by particular organs of perception. Not only does this produce error, which I can correct by changing my location, drawing closer to what appears, or by improving my imagination to take other perspectives into account; it also gives birth to true semblances-that is true deceptive appearances, which I cannot correct like an error (pp. 108-109).
The term "political risk" thus appears overly constrained from both an analytical and operational viewpoint. What we are, or should be, concerned with is the impact of events which are political in the sense that they arise from power or authority relationships and which affect (or have the potential to affect) the firm's operations. Not the events, qua events, but their potential manifestation as constraints upon foreign investors should be of concern. Furthermore, although the same constraint (for example, restrictions on profit repatriations or a forced divestment of ownership) could be motivated by economic as well as political factors (or both) depending upon the circumstances, the two may be differentiated to facilitate analysis and response. Last, political events may affect only the value of returns, or they may also contribute to business risk depending upon whether outcomes are evaluated under conditions approximating certainty or uncertainty. If that uncertainty is subjective, as it is likely to be in an international business decision, the contribution to risk will be greater because one is uncertain about both outcomes and the probabilities associated with them. Integration 71 of the assessment of political risk into the investment decision process will be discussed next.
Integration Into The integration of political assessments into decision making is not a subject that has Decision Making been widely discussed. The literature focuses typically upon deriving probabilistic estimates of political events and their impact upon the firm rather than how the estimates are utilized; this study conforms to that tradition. Most authors who have considered the problem assume that decision makers will utilize political analysis to adjust either cash flows or the discount rate. Robock [46] , for example, shows how risk analysis can be used to determine the political risks likely to arise during specific time periods and then suggests that "the present value of expected cash flows, or the internal rate of return from the investment project under consideration can be adjusted to reflect the timing and magnitude of risk probabilities" (p. Although agreeing with Shapiro that, in evaluating the impact of the political environment on the firm, both the effect upon the magnitude of cash flows and on their distribution (that is, risk) must be taken into account, we would like to avoid entering the lists on the question of whether the firm should be viewed as a social organization reflecting managerial utilities (and risk preferences) or as an agent of the stockholders. Instead, we suggest that the potential effect of politics be evaluated in terms of the continuum discussed earlier. Under conditions giving rise to risk, whether one actually adjusts the discount rate or not will be determined by one's judgment as to 1) the applicability of the Capital Asset Pricing Model and 2) whether the risk is systematic or not. Under conditions approximating certainty, decision makers should be concerned only with determining the effect of political events on the magnitude of cash flows. Risk, clearly is not a relevant concern; however, political assessment and evaluation is still necessary. Certain outcomes are not inherently obvious; they are certain, given sufficient information about the environment and the firm. Under conditions approximating objective uncertainty, the decision maker must con-sider the impact of politics on both the expected value of cash flows and their distribution (or business risk). The estimate of the contribution to risk will flow solely from the distribution of the joint probability of a political event taking place and affecting cash flows. Last, under conditions of subjective uncertainty, the decision maker is again concerned with the effect of political events upon both expected values and risk. However, in this instance risk is increased because one is uncertain about the shape of the probability distribution. In fact one knows one's esimate is inherently distorted due to subjective factors and that the distortion can never be completely eliminated. One additional point entails an implicit normative assumption which is counterproductive in terms of the very issue of concern:2 The tendency to view political risk in terms of government interference with one's operations. York Times, and other such journals. They read a great deal. They also read trade papers. But, in making specific business decisions, they did not do research in published sources.... Knowledge of foreign economic affairs came either from the most general news sources or, more vividly, from correspondence and personal experience (p. 470). Zink [66] found that managers' major sources of political information were reports from host country employees, general news sources, and financial institutions (in that order). Only 23 percent of respondents considered internal political staff as an important source, and only 9 percent so rated outside consultants on a continuous retainer. Keegan [30] concluded that his study of managers at MNC Headquarters emphasized "how little the systematic methods of information scanning have become a part of the way in which executives learn about their business environments" (p. 420). Executives stationed abroad (but not lower level employees), banks, and the public press were the most important sources of information for headquarters managers. The findings reviewed here are impressively consistent. First, it is clear that managers consider political instability or political risk, typically quite loosely defined, to be an important factor in the foreign investment decision. Second, it is just as clear that rigorous and systematic assessment and evaluation of the political environment is exceptional. Most political analysis is superficial and subjective, not integrated formally into the decision-making process and assumes that instability and risk are one and the same. The response frequently is avoidance; firms simply do not get involved in countries, or even regions, that they perceive to be risky. Last, managers appear to rely for environmental information primarily on sources internal to the firm. When they look for outside data, they are most likely to go to their banks or the general and business media. Although there are inherent limits of aggregate quantitative analysis-as with the Delphi techniques, it ignores industry and firm specific factors-it does offer a great deal of potential as a basis for systematic and rigorous assessment of the political environment. (However, that it can now, or at any point in the future, be utilized independently of qualitative judgments is not suggested.) In spite of the fact that most of the methodologies discussed were developed to aid in international firms' assessment of the political environment, they still measure political instability rather than the potential impact of politics upon the firm. The problem transcends that of index development. While most authors reviewed agree that political instability and political risk are distinct phenomena, the fact of the matter is that enough is not known about how the former (and the political environment in general) affects the latter to construct reasonable predictive models.
Much of the discussion of political risk appears to assume that governmental restrictions on FDI-such as, partial divestment or local content regulations-involve economically inefficient and perhaps even irrational tampering with flows of direct investment that provide net benefits to their recipients. It is obvious that this viewpoint is less than universally accepted and that what appears as economic nationalism3 to an investor may be regarded as an attempt to implement a policy of indigenous industrialization
Managers use a wide variety of techniques to reduce and cope with uncertainty in CONCLUSIONS many areas of business operations. Most firms, for example, would not even consider basing a major new product introduction on a generalized feel for the market. Rather, they typically utilize a battery of relatively sophisticated research techniques to aid in reaching a judgment about both the product's potential and how to market it. Yet, judgments about the impact of politics upon operations appear, at least from the sources reviewed in this paper, to be rather superficial and typically based almost entirely on subjective perceptions. To be absolutely clear, "sophisticated analysis" is not equated here with a complex mathematical model, but rather, what is suggested is a systematic and relatively rigorous approach to data gathering and problem solving. While stereotypes are admittedly unfair, the all too typical process, where political instability is equated with a poor investment climate and the market avoided, is a long way from that ideal. The literature reviewed in this paper reflects the substantial growth and development of a relatively new area; however, some fairly major gaps must be filled if it is to contribute to more systematic and rigorous assessment and evaluation of politics by managers of international firms and to the effective integration of the information into the decisionmaking process. The lacunae that exist are both conceptual and empirical. We need better definitions of the phenomena, a conceptual structure relating politics to the firm, and a great deal of information about the impact of the political environment. The three are, of course, related.
